CHAPTER 8

Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice

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PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL DIVERSITY

The propositions that persons develop in cultures and that cultural arrangements frame their moral lives are not controversial. Deep disagreements do exist, however, concerning what cultures are like and what it means to say that culture frames moral development. Divergent views on these issues translate, in turn, into critically different understandings of the nature of the diversity of moral experiences across cultures.

The perspective on moral development in culture presented in this chapter is grounded on a developmental theory that posits that persons develop moral and other social concepts within their culture through participation in and reflection on social interactions of different kinds (Turiel, 1983; 1998a). This perspective is also informed by contemporary scholarship in cultural anthropology (Abu-Lughod, 1991; Wikan, 1991) positing that cultures are historical constructs created and sustained in the context of collaborations, disagreements, power clashes, and contested meanings among individuals—men and women, adults and children, have and have nots. This view holds that cultures do not have the power to make people feel, think, or act certain ways; they are multifaceted environments offering opportunities for diverse kinds of social interactions. Persons, including children, are capable of reflecting on social interactions embedded in the practices and traditions of their culture; disagreements about what is right or valuable are common. Rather than being products of their culture and exchangeable copies of other members of their culture, people in cultures “are confronted with choices, struggle with others, make conflicting statements, argue about points of view on the same events, undergo ups and downs in various relationships and changes in their circumstances and desires, face new pressures,
and fail to predict what will happen to them or those around them’’ (Abu-Lughod, 1991, p. 154).

This perspective contrasts with propositions centered on the cultural determination of development, propositions typically grouped under the broad umbrella of cultural psychology (Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993). Although those propositions differ in meaningful ways, they also share key assumptions about culture and development that are of consequence to the study of moral development in culture. From the viewpoint of cultural psychology, cultures are presumed to be all-embracing constructs that form relatively coherent patterns of thought and action, with the patterns of one culture differing from those of another. The psychology of individuals is said to be structured in accord to the culture’s dominant pattern or orientation, and persons are generally believed to be predisposed to participate in culture and to accept and reproduce their culture’s main features. Although the means by which cultures achieve enculturation (Herskovits, 1947, 1955) has not been specified in much detail, the assumption of cultural psychologists is that a culture’s orientation is explicitly or tacitly communicated to, and acquired by, the members of a culture through top-down processes of cultural transmission by “local guardians of the moral order” (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) or through participation in cultural practices and socially prescribed forms of behavior (Rogoff, 1990). As a result of these processes, members of cultures are assumed to have a shared commitment to goals, values, and developmental paths, indeed, a shared culture.

Cultural psychologists’ notion of coherent and consistent patterns of cultural organization is best exemplified by the proposition that patterns of culture can be broadly sorted into individualistic or collectivist. According to this formulation, cultures with an individualistic orientation (e.g., the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand) structure social experience around autonomous persons, relatively detached from their relationships and community, and motivated to attain freedom and personal goals. Cultures whose core is collectivistic (e.g., much of Asia, Africa, and South America) structure social experience around collectives such as the family or the community; members of collectivistic cultures are identified largely by their interdependent roles and by the duties prescribed to them by the collective social system (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1990). Within the realm of moral development, individualistic and collectivistic cultures have been described as maintaining fundamentally divergent conceptions of morality (Shweder et al., 1987). Morality in individualistic cultures is rights based, and is structured by concerns with furthering and protecting the independence of the individual; rights, equality, justice, and individual freedoms make up individualistic moral codes and social practices. By contrast, collectivistic cultures have a more interdependent duty-based morality, in which the organizing features are the actions dictated by the rules and duties assigned by one’s role in the social system, to the exclusion of concerns with rights, freedoms, and personal agency.

Although the construct of individualism/collectivism has enjoyed tremendous popularity as a model of variability in human thought, emotion, and behavior, and generated a great deal of research across many cultures and across a wide array of domains (for overviews, see Kagitciibasi & Berry, 1989; Triandis, 1990, 1995), its focus on differences between cultures has led to the overlooking or downplaying of differences within cultures. Entire cultures (indeed, entire continents) have been characterized according to their presumably uniform orientation to individualism or collectivism, to rights or duties, to independence or interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). This emphasis on cultural homogeneity became the target of criticism by anthropologists and developmental psychologists, who argued that autonomy and interdependence are not mutually exclusive but
interwoven in development, coexisting in the thoughts and actions of people in Western and non-Western societies (Holloway, 2000; Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Spiro, 1993; Strauss, 2000; Turiel, 1998a, 2002; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994, 2000; Wainryb, 1997; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). A recent meta-analysis of both cross-national research and research conducted in the United States since 1980 (Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002) confirmed that differences between individualistic and collectivistic societies are neither large nor systematic, and that societies and individuals cannot be accurately characterized in terms of a single orientation.

Over the years, descriptions of cultures as individualistic or collectivistic gave way to portrayals allowing a mixture of individualistic and collectivistic elements (compare, for example, Markus & Kitayama [1991] with Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama [1997] and Shweder et al. [1987] with Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park [1997]). Nevertheless, even those propositions presuppose a substantial level of cultural homogeneity and a process of cultural patterning of psychological development. In one such formulation, individualism and collectivism are conceptualized as ideal types at opposite poles of a continuous dimension. Although cultures are portrayed as striking a specific balance between the two ideal types with different proportions of individualistic and collectivistic elements (Greenfield, 1994; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994), they are still thought to cohere around a dominant orientation. For example, the particular mixture of individualistic and collectivistic elements in Japanese society has been described as indicative of a set point on the collectivistic side of the dimension, whereas the mixture of orientations in American society is said to be indicative of a set point on the individualistic side (Greenfield, 1995). A different argument has been that cultures may be heterogeneous insofar as smaller cultural communities or subcultures—each with its own cultural orientation—coexist within a larger society. This formulation, too, leaves intact the assumption that cultures (although smaller in size) are entities with a dominant and relatively homogeneous core of shared meanings, values, traditions, and practices; in this view, too, persons are locked into enacting (multiple) cultural scripts.

Although formulations that allow for the coexistence of mixed orientations capture some aspects of the multifaceted experiences that make up social life within cultures, cultural analyses in all their incarnations downplay the scope of social and moral diversity within cultures. For example, some such formulations recognize that conflicts might arise between the values of different subcultures within a society. Those conflicts, however, are considered to be conflicts between cultural groups—a move that allows for retaining the assumption of homogeneity and harmony within cultural groups. Because persons’ goals and perspectives are thought to be shaped by their culture’s dominant orientation, the possibility that individuals within a culture (or subculture) may develop different perspectives or enter into significant conflict with each other is not a central consideration. The resulting view is one where people’s concerns mirror their culture’s orientation, with little substantial conflict among people within a culture.

In a provocative critique of cultural psychology, Gjerde (2004) has noted that underlying cultural analyses of this type is an essentialist belief that

... there exist natural entities—often described as tribes, ethnicities or cultural groups—that share essences such as language, blood, kinship, or customs, and whose affinity is real, natural and overpowering. In this view, each individual possesses the properties of his or her culture and groups can take on the status of independent variables and operate as causative factors. These characteristics are presumed to be so deeply inscribed that each person within the ‘cultural unit’ can be treated as an exchangeable item...[and] peoples are reduced to miniature representations of their societies, cultures, and continents. (p. 142)
Gjerde’s depiction of the position of cultural psychology as essentialist is likely to meet with some resistance on the part of cultural psychologists who, instead, claim to acknowledge the central role of individual agency (e.g., Shweder & Sullivan, 1993). Whether the label of essentialism does or does not fit them, it is a fact that cultural analyses have consistently neglected to specify developmental processes by which individuals might come to resist, or even disagree with, cultural norms and practices. Their inattention to those aspects of development is, furthermore, unlikely to be an oversight. On the contrary, the emphasis placed by cultural analyses on the cultural shaping of psychological processes implicates, by definition, both the tendency to overestimate a culture’s power to dictate meanings and the tendency to underestimate individual agency.

The view of cultures as speaking in a collective, shared, voice is inconsistent with evidence pointing to the plurality of concerns of persons within cultures, to the conflicts and disagreements among persons within cultures, and to the multiple interpretations and critical judgments that persons make about their culture’s norms and practices. This type of heterogeneity cannot be fully accounted for by formulations emphasizing the cultural determination or patterning of development, not even those that allow for the coexistence within a society of multiple cultural templates. As discussed more fully in the next section, explanations of cultural heterogeneity require more than estimating the specific proportions of collectivistic and individualistic elements. Orientations to both autonomy and interdependence are central in social relationships; persons develop multiple goals and concerns (some individualistic-like and some collectivistic-like), and make different—often conflict ridden—judgments and decisions depending on their interpretation of specific contexts within culture.

In the developmentally grounded perspective on morality and culture presented in this chapter (see also Turiel & Wainryb, 1994, 2000), the analysis shifts away from the cultural patterning of development to focus instead on the diverse experiences of persons in multiple contexts within culture. Wouldn’t such an *acultural discourse*—a discourse that downplays the impact of cultural meanings and practices on the development of morality—yield data about “highly general and somewhat vacuous commonalities” in moral outlook (Miller, 2001, p. 159) and render moral and social life homogeneous, human only in a generic sense? Cultural psychologists might think so, for they view the notion of culture as critical for anchoring the idea of human diversity and for giving voice to diverse cultural outlooks. From a developmental perspective, however, it is moving away from culture as the main anchor of diversity that allows capture of the full range of human diversity.

The study of social and moral development in culture is inevitably tied to questions about the nature of moral diversity, questions whose import extends beyond academia (Wainryb, 2004b). Democratic societies in North America and Western Europe, increasingly multicultural in their composition, face the serious challenges of deciding whether to accommodate and how to best respond to the social and moral practices and values of immigrants coming from diverse cultures. At stake are concerns with human rights, equality, and respect for human diversity.

Propositions emphasizing the cultural patterning of social and moral development have emerged largely in response to the perceived ethnocentricity and Western biases of explanations that emphasize universal characteristics, and have been advanced with the explicit goal of promoting a richer view of human development. As recently as the 1980s, cultural psychologists spoke of “an intellectual climate suspicious of a one-sided emphasis on fixed essences, intrinsic features, and universally necessary truths” (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 500). In response, they championed culture as the main source of development—the origin and organizer of the self, emotion, cognition, and values. Their intellectual agenda
included studying “the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, transform, and permute the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion” (Shweder, 1990, p. 1), “examining ethnic and cultural sources of psychological diversity in emotional and somatic functioning, self organization, moral evaluation, social cognition, and human development” (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 497), and developing “a credible theory of psychological pluralism” (p. 498).

Traditionally, then, propositions emphasizing the cultural patterning of social and moral development have been associated with the fight against racism and, more recently, with the promotion of multiculturalism and the rights of cultures. Their underlying assumption, that each culture has a distinctive point of view that makes sense within the culture, has been typically taken to imply that each cultural point of view is deserving of respect or, at the very least, tolerance by those outside the culture (Shweder, 2000, 2002). Seldom has it been acknowledged, however, that this call for respect and tolerance also presupposes that cultures have only one distinctive point of view—one insider perspective, one local voice.

By contrast, the perspective presented in this chapter points to the multiple and conflicting social and moral viewpoints found within cultures. The range of human diversity cannot therefore be fully represented in terms of differences between cultures. Furthermore, the very construct of culture cannot plausibly serve as the basis for promoting respect for human diversity and justice. Why? Because propositions concerning the cultural patterning of development highlight participation in culture and acceptance of cultural norms and practices and make light of the possibility that some members of cultures might dislike, resent, resist, and wish to change some aspects of their culture. Therefore, by relying on the notion of culture as the main anchor of human diversity, one is bound to overlook the experiences of some of the very groups and individuals that the notion of culture was meant to give voice to.

MORAL LIFE IN CONTESTED CULTURAL LANDSCAPES: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Persons—adults and children—live and develop in multifaceted social environments, try to make sense of their diverse social experiences, disagree with one another about the meanings of social practices and the norms and values that regulate them and, at times, assume critical attitudes toward aspects of their social environment and resist or even attempt to change them. Persons occupying social positions with more or less power often have different experiences and develop different goals and interests which, at times, come into conflict with each other. It is the diverse, and often conflict-ridden, social experiences of persons in culture—rather than dominant cultural configurations or templates—that influence social and moral development (Turiel & Wainryb, 1994, 2000).

Descriptions of social and moral development in terms of global cultural orientations, such as right-based and duty-based moral codes, cannot capture the multiplicity of concerns and goals that are part of the social and moral lives of individuals in cultures, or the varied ways in which individuals prioritize those concerns and goals in specific contexts, or disagree with one another about those priorities. This is not to say that culture is unimportant or that social and moral development does not take place in cultural contexts. Rather, it is argued that to account for the full range of variation in cultural contexts and, in turn, to allow for meaningful cross-cultural comparisons, it necessary to avoid characterizing cultures in terms of opposites or dualisms (Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Turiel, 1998a, 2002; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994, 2000; Wainryb, 1997; Wainryb & Turiel, 1995).
Although it may be possible to draw comparisons between cultural groups, such comparisons must be made in ways that recognize the complexity of social experiences within societies. Cultural discourse and ideology are subject to interpretation and even criticism by members of society. To fully account for the full range of social and moral diversity within cultural contexts, research must extend its focus beyond cultural symbols and shared understandings, and recognize the active role of individuals in attributing meanings to their experience, reinterpreting cultural ideologies, and making judgments at variance with cultural practices.

A large body of programmatic research conducted over the last 25 years has yielded reliable evidence concerning the multifaceted social and moral experiences of children and adults in different cultural settings. Although research was first conducted largely in North America, to date studies have been conducted in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Central and South America. Two distinct, though related and mutually informative, sets of findings bear evidence to the heterogeneity of moral life and to the developmental roots of such heterogeneity. One set of findings documents the multiple social and moral concerns that persons across cultures develop, and the diverse ways in which persons weigh those concerns as they make sense of specific social contexts within their cultures. The other set of findings points to the conflicting perspectives developed by individuals occupying different positions in society. The view of persons, including children, as agents capable of reflection and interpretation, likely to engage in cooperation with others as well as in conflict and subterfuge, underlies both sets of findings.

**Multiple Social and Moral Concerns Within Cultures**

The diversity of children’s social and moral concerns has been amply documented among members of both Western and non-Western societies. Extensive research carried out in North America has demonstrated that children begin to form differentiated social concepts at an early age. Children develop concerns with the self and the person’s autonomy, entitlements, and rights—concerns that might be thought of as individualistic. Multiple experimental and observational studies have shown that areas of personal autonomy are demarcated largely in the context of conflicts, tensions, and negotiations with authority figures such as parents. Even at ages 4 and 5 years, preschool children have been shown to negotiate with parents over issues they believe to be within their own personal jurisdiction, and reject adult rules and intervention as illegitimate (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Smetana, 1989; Weber, 1999). Research has also shown that conflicts between children and their parents over the definition of the personal domain become more frequent in adolescence, as teens increasingly challenge the legitimacy of their parents’ control over matters such as their personal appearance, cleaning their room, and curfew (Smetana, 1988, 1989, 2000; Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Gaines, 1999).

In addition to concerns with a realm of personal choice, children also develop concerns with individual freedoms and rights. In studies conducted in the United States and Canada (Helwig, 1995, 1997, 1998; see also Helwig, chap. 7, in this volume; Ruck, Abramovitch & Keating, 1998), for example, children as young as 6 or 7 years conceptualized freedoms of speech and religion as universal moral rights, which hold across cultural contexts even in the face of laws denying these rights. In justifying those rights as universal, children and adolescents appealed to conceptions of human agency and personal choice; adolescents also referred to the importance of these rights for maintaining democratic social and political organizations that guarantee all individuals a voice (Helwig, 1998). Similar findings were obtained in various European countries (Doise, Clemence & Spini, 1996).
In spite of the centrality that notions of personal autonomy and rights have for children in Western societies, research has reliably shown that children are also concerned with the well-being of others, justice, and fairness, concerns that could be seen as inconsistent with the individualistic characterization of Western societies. Children also develop collectivistic-like concerns with authority and obedience (Damon, 1977; Laupa, 1991; Laupa & Turiel, 1986; Tisak, 1986), social roles and conventions (Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Tisak & Turiel, 1988; Turiel, 1983), as well as with interpersonal obligations (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Neff, Turiel & Anshel, 2002; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991).

When social interactions bear simultaneously on concerns with the individual (e.g., personal choice, rights, autonomy) and the collective (obedience, mutuality, collective interests), children do not merely place individualistic goals ahead of group goals. Instead, they appraise and interpret the specific features and parameters of those contexts and make judgments that vary by context, giving priority to individualistic concerns in some situations and to collectivistic concerns in others. Research conducted in the United States and Canada has shown that North American children (and adults) often upheld personal autonomy and rights, but are also responsive to other features of social situations and, in many contexts, subordinated the concerns with autonomy and rights to concerns bearing on the prevention of harm to others (Helwig, 1995, 1997), interpersonal obligations (Neff et al., 2002; Smetana et al., 1991), friendship and mutuality (Kahn & Turiel, 1988), group goals (Killen, 1990), and even authority (Fuligni, 1998; Laupa, 1991; Laupa & Turiel, 1986, 1993; Smetana, 1988, 1989; Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Bitz, 1996; Tisak, 1986).

Similar findings were observed among members of traditional societies, where one might have expected that concerns with autonomy and individual rights would be systematically subordinated to the maintenance of social harmony, the preservation of hierarchy, and the upholding of traditional roles and duties. Although research with members of traditional cultures has been less extensive, a substantial body of research in Asia (e.g., China [Helwig, Arnold, Tan, & Boyd, 2003]; Hong Kong [Yau & Smetana, 1996, 2003a, 2003b], India [Madden, 1992; Neff, 2001], Indonesia [Carey & Ford, 1983], Japan [Crystal, 2000; Crystal, Watanabe, Weinfurt, & Wu, 1998; Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995], Korea [Kim, 1998; Kim & Turiel, 1996; Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987], Taiwan [Killen, Ardila-Rey, Barakkats & Wang, 2000]), the Middle East (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; Wainryb, 1995; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), Africa (e.g., Benin [Conry, 2004], Nigeria [Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986], Zambia [Zimba, 1987]), and Central and South America (e.g., Brazil [Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 1996], Colombia [Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001; Killen et al., 2000; Mensing, 2002], and El Salvador [Killen et al., 2000]) has demonstrated that children in traditional cultures form a mixture of judgments on the dimensions of morality, social convention, and interpersonal obligation, while also maintaining concepts of persons as autonomous agents with choices, entitlements, and rights. Research examining the ways in which concerns with autonomy and interdependence are weighed and played out when they come into conflict indicated that children and adults in traditional societies do not subordinate individualistic goals to the concerns of the collective (as had been suggested by Triandis, 1990), but make judgments that account for and vary with the features of the context.

The conceptualization of persons in traditional societies as autonomous agents, with personal jurisdiction, personal choices, entitlements, and rights is of particular importance because of the common presumption that members of such cultures form sociocentric and interdependent concepts that override concerns with personal autonomy and independence. As put by Triandis, “In the case of extreme collectivism individuals do not have personal goals, attitudes, beliefs, or values, but only reflect those of the ingroup. One’s behavior is
totally predictable from social roles...” (1990, p. 52; see also Cousins, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1982; Triandis, 1989).

Research in several countries has demonstrated that persons in traditional societies develop concepts of personal agency including a sense of self, personal goals and interests, as well as an understanding that other persons also have personal goals and interests. Preschoolers in Hong Kong (Yau & Smetana, 2003a), children in Brazil (Nucci et al., 1996), and Colombia (Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001), and adolescents in Japan (Crystal, 2000; Crystal et al., 1998; Gjerde & Onishi, 2000; Holloway, 1999, 2000; Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995), Hong Kong (Yau & Smetana, 1996, 2003b), and mainland China (Helwig et al., 2003) carve up areas of personal autonomy, including regulation of activities, schoolwork, personal appearance, chores, and friendships, which they think should be outside parental and societal regulation and subject exclusively to personal discretion. Children have disagreements with their parents over those issues, attempt to balance personal autonomy with other goals, and in many contexts uphold autonomy even in the face of conflicts with important competing social concerns, such as family harmony, the preservation of hierarchy, and obedience to roles and duties. Children in traditional societies appeal to individualistic concepts such as personal choice, freedom from adult interference, and the pursuit of individual desires and wants. Research with the Druze (Wainryb, 1995) and in India (Neff, 2001) has similarly suggested that in many contexts children and adolescents uphold the primacy of personal choice over interpersonal obligations.

Noteworthy are also the findings that adults in traditional societies recognize a realm of personal choice for their children. Several studies have shown that Chinese mothers from Taiwan and from mainland China residing in North America, and mothers in Japan and Brazil believe that children should be allowed some independent decision making (e.g., Chuang [2000] in Taiwan; Xu [2000] in mainland China) largely because of the perceived need to foster the child’s developing autonomy and sense of individuality. Similarly, preschool teachers in Colombia, El Salvador, and Taiwan listed among their important goals not only teaching cooperation, but also fostering the child’s autonomy and self-reliance (Killen et al., 2000).

In addition to concepts bearing on a realm of personal jurisdiction, children in traditional societies also develop concepts of individual rights and freedoms (see also Helwig chap. 7, in this volume). As examples, children and adolescents in China (Helwig et al., 2003) and among the Druze in northern Israel (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998) maintain that freedom of speech, religion, and reproduction are basic human rights not contingent on existing laws and, in general, generate obligations of noninterference on the part of the government. Furthermore, they uphold those rights in many conditions, even in the face of conflicts with parental authority or other collective concerns. Not unlike the findings among North American children and adolescents, considerations with the prevention of harm, rather than with duty and obedience, were seen as consistently overriding individual rights.

When considered as a whole, research indicates that persons in traditional cultures judge in accord with roles, duties, and traditions in the social system, and also have a pervasive sense of persons as independent agents, with autonomy, entitlements, and rights. They draw boundaries on the jurisdiction of authority commands, and are aware of personal choice, entitlements, and rights as components of their social interactions. In exercising personal autonomy, they weigh their freedoms against other social considerations, such as the goals of the group, the welfare of others, and the hierarchical roles in the cultural system, revealing a complex picture of priorities and preferences.

Two systematic age-related patterns were observed in both Western and non-Western societies. Concerns with autonomy and personal choice were seen to increase systematically
with age in all cultures, and across societies, children’s judgments became more discriminative, nuanced, and context sensitive with age. Together, these findings suggest that the shift toward increased autonomy in adolescence and the increased understanding and concern with features of the social context reflect general developmental shifts rather than the manifestation of specific cultural orientations.

The finding that personal goals and individual rights are part of the thinking of members of hierarchically organized societies should not be taken to mean that those concerns are manifested identically across societies. The proposition, rather, is that irrespective of the type of cultural arrangements, interpersonal relationships are never merely the context for the enactment of cultural scripts. Relationships are multifaceted and involve mutual expectations, conflicts, and negotiations over issues of personal preference, rights, and fairness. It is argued, therefore, that in the context of most relationships some persons might attempt to impose their own personal choices and decisions on others; others might attempt to pursue their own personal goals and desires, try to assert their rights and entitlements, and arrive at compromises. How those issues are manifested may well vary (Turiel, 1994, 1996, 1998b).

Developmental and anthropological research illustrates the diverse ways in which personal autonomy is manifested in societies that are organized more restrictively around hierarchical systems. Research conducted with the hierarchically organized Israeli Druze community (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), for example, has shown that persons occupying dominant positions in society have a strong sense of personal prerogative and entitlement. The experiences of autonomy for persons in subordinate positions, by contrast, are constrained and narrowed by society’s demands for conformity. In most cases, persons in subordinate positions judge that not expressing their desires for personal freedom is preferable or necessary. Nonetheless, they are aware of their own goals and agendas, and view their roles and duties as unfairly restricting their autonomy and rights. Similarly, adults and women from all strata of Indian society (Mines, 1988) describe themselves as having personal goals (e.g., occupational interests, economic goals) separate from the goals of their social group, many describe such goals as being in clear opposition to societal expectations, and most report postponing pursuing their goals until later in life, when the consequences of asserting their autonomy are less extreme (e.g., when disinheritance is no longer a threat). Further evidence of the diverse ways in which the striving for autonomy is manifested within the context of society’s demands for conformity can be seen in the more or less covert processes of maneuvering and negotiation typical of persons in subordinate positions within societies; examples are the behaviors of South Asian women (Ewing, 1990, 1991), and of women in harems (Mernissi, 1994) and polygynous Bedouin societies (Abu-Lughod, 1993). Developmental research across cultures (Smetana, 2002) similarly indicated that although adolescents in traditional and Western societies express similar desires for personal autonomy, overt conflict between adolescents and parents in traditional societies was more muted—was reported to be less frequent and less intense—than among adolescents and their parents in Western societies.

The findings considered in this section indicate that children and adults across societies develop multiple social and moral concerns. These findings also indicate that children and adults across societies apply those concerns differently in different social contexts, giving priority sometimes to autonomy and rights and sometimes to tradition and social harmony. The proposition that social contexts have an influence on social judgments and actions is neither novel nor controversial. Findings from disparate perspectives, including social psychological research on conformity (Asch, 1952), obedience (Milgram, 1963), and prosocial behavior (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Darley, 1970), as well as large-scale public opinion surveys dealing with attitudes toward personal freedoms and rights.
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(McClosky & Brill, 1983; Stouffer, 1955), and behavioristic studies dealing with learning and conditioning (Gewirtz, 1972) have long ago indicated that contextual variations are associated with significant shifts in judgments and actions. As examples, large-scale opinion surveys have shown persons endorse freedoms of speech and religion, freedom of assembly, the right to privacy and to divergent lifestyles in many situations; in other situations they subordinate those rights and freedoms to considerations of tradition, the maintenance of public order, or the welfare of others. Similarly, bystander intervention studies have shown that persons display a sense of interdependence and altruism in some contexts and a detached or individualistic tendency in others (for a more extensive discussion of these and similar findings, see Turiel & Wainryb [1994]).

One interpretation of the findings obtained in various types of psychological research concerning the contextual shifts in judgments and behaviors is that variations in judgments and behavior are mechanically elicited by variations in contextual features. An alternative interpretation—one that better captures the interactive process by which persons come to know and make decisions about their social world—is that the variations in contextual features alter the meaning of the situations being perceived and judged. This interpretation rests on the idea that persons make judgments about the total context experienced (Asch, 1952; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Turiel & Wainryb, 1994). When viewed this way, the evidence of contextual variations in judgments and behaviors is consistent with the developmental proposition that social and moral understandings stem from an interactive process between the individual and diverse aspects of the social environment, a process entailing what Turiel recently labeled flexibilities of mind (Turiel & Perkins, 2004; see also Turiel, chap. 1, in this volume).

Regardless of their cultural background, children (and adults) are flexible in their approach to their social experiences and relationships: They continuously appraise the features of the social contexts in which they participate, adjust their understandings and behaviors, and make judgments that vary systematically in accord to the meanings and interpretations they attribute to those contexts. Research conducted over the last 15 years has documented aspects of the interactive and interpretive process that goes into making social and moral judgments (Wainryb, 2000, 2004a). This research has shown that when children (and adults) make social and moral judgments, they do so in reference to their interpretations of specific features of social contexts, such as their understandings of the relevant facts (Wainryb, 1991, 1993; Wainryb & Ford, 1998; Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 2004; Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998), the covert and overt responses of the persons involved (Shaw & Wainryb, 2004), their psychological states (Brehl & Wainryb, 2004; Chandler, Sokol, & Wainryb, 2000; Wainryb & Ford, 1998), and roles (Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2004), as well as the shared or contested nature of those understandings (Shaw & Wainryb, 1999).

Altogether, the research considered in this section indicates that persons in traditional and Western societies alike develop concerns with autonomy and rights, with group goals, harmony, and tradition, with human welfare, and with justice. The research also shows that rather than enacting cultural scripts, persons across societies approach social contexts within their cultures with flexibility.

Power and Conflicting Perspectives Within Cultures

The diversity of concerns that persons (children and adults) bring to bear on their sociomoral interactions and understandings in different contexts is one indication of the flexibility with which they approach their social environment. In addition, persons within
a culture may also attribute different meanings to the same social contexts; this is especially evident, and especially meaningful, among individuals with unequal power. In fact, the analyses of power and conflict within cultures are extremely significant for cultural analyses because they reveal that the meanings of cultural norms and practices are not shared among people in different roles (Turiel, 1994, 1996, 2002).

Social life in cultures includes not only collaboration, but also power clashes among individuals. In most societies, disagreements about what is right and valuable are common. Cultural practices and traditions are not authentic representations of the past handed down from one generation to the next; they are shaped, contested, and changed in the context of overt and covert disagreements and conflicts (Gjerde, 2004; Wikan, 2002). As mentioned, persons across cultures—even in traditional, hierarchically organized cultures—carve up a realm of personal goals and interests, and strive to achieve and maintain control over their own goals and interests even in the face of competing social considerations. It makes sense, therefore, that rather than (or at the least, in addition to) developing shared understandings about aspects of their culture, persons occupying social positions with more or less power interpret their experiences differently, develop different goals, interests, and perspectives, and find themselves in conflict with each other.

The contested nature of cultural meanings and practices, and the ubiquity of discontent and conflict among individuals in subordinate positions in traditional societies have been amply documented in journalistic accounts and ethnographic studies. Bumiller’s (1990) account of the perspectives of women in India, Goodwin’s (1994) interviews with women in Islamic countries, and Mernissi’s (1994) account of women’s and children’s life in a harem in Morocco, show that women are aware of the burdens and injustices they experience as a consequence of cultural practices that accord men control over them. Abu Lughod’s (1993) ethnographic studies of Bedouin women in Egypt illustrate the many ways in which women deliberately disobey and subvert practices they consider unfair, such as arranged marriages and polygamy. Similarly, Chen’s (1995) work in Bangladesh and India documents defiant acts against traditions restricting employment for women and people of lower social castes. Conflict and discontent are also present in Western societies, as evidenced by the ubiquity of social movements challenging existing arrangements bearing on racial, economic, and gender relations (e.g., Okin, 1989). Across cultures, individuals often resist cultural practices and traditions that oppress them or, at the least, express discontent and give voice to their thwarted wishes. Sometimes resistance takes the form of organized political and social movements, but persons also challenge cultural meanings in everyday life through overt and covert activities (Turiel, 1994, 1996, 2002, 2003; see also Turiel, chap. 1, in this volume).

To understand moral and social development it is, therefore, not sufficient to attend to the perspectives of those with power, the very perspectives that are predominant in a culture’s public discourse. The perspectives of those who lack the power to make their views count as culture must be documented as well. Systematic research into the perspectives held by people occupying subordinate positions in regard to their culture’s practices revealed several layers of interpretation and conflict associated with power differentials in culture consider. A series of studies conducted among the Israeli Druze community, a traditional and hierarchically organized society arranged around a patrilineal and patriarchal family structure (for comprehensive descriptions of this society, see Turiel & Wainryb [1994] and Wainryb & Turiel [1994]). This research, focused on conflicts between men and women or girls within the family, indicated that persons in different roles, with more or less power, had different experiences of and made different judgments about what were, ostensibly, the same situations.
For example, when considering conflicts between husbands and wives or between fathers and daughters in which the person in the dominant position objected to the behaviors of the person in the subordinate position, male and female participants attributed a great deal of decision making power to husbands and fathers, and judged that those conflicts should be resolved by the wife or daughter acquiescing to the man’s wishes. As would be expected from a patriarchal society, their reasoning revolved around concerns with duties, social roles, and interdependence in the hierarchical system. However, the same participants approached conflicts between husband and wife or father and daughter differently when it was the person in the subordinate position who objected to the behaviors of the person in the dominant position. In that context, they stated that a wife or daughter should not interfere with a man’s decisions, and accorded to men autonomy and entitlements. Thus, what appears to be one social context—disagreements between husband and wife or father and daughter—was interpreted in terms of status, roles, and interdependence in one condition (when a man objects to his wife’s or daughter’s choice), and in terms of independence, individual choice, and autonomy in the other condition (when a wife or daughter objects to her husband’s or father’s choice). Similar findings documenting the different perspectives concerning the freedoms and entitlements of those in dominant and subordinate positions have been obtained in India (Neff, 2001), Colombia (Mensing, 2002), and Benin (Conry, 2004).

Another important finding in these studies was that the experience of disagreeing with another family member had a different quality and carried distinctly different consequences for different persons. Whereas family disagreements carried a strong sense of entitlements for men, Druze women and girls described the serious negative consequences to a woman’s welfare if she failed to acquiesce to her husband’s or father’s wishes: the husband might divorce the wife, throw the wife or daughter out of the house, or cause her physical harm. The importance of this finding is twofold. First, it shows that members of a society might have different experiences. Furthermore, it suggests that members of a society might adhere to cultural practices not only out of commitment to the culture, but also out of concern with the consequences likely to ensue from their failure to do so. This is of tremendous consequence for the study of social and moral development and culture, because of demonstrate that even when people go along with and participate in presumable shared cultural practices and traditions, the meaning of their participation in those practices is unclear. It is indeed likely that participation in shared cultural practices and traditions more often than not conceals struggles over meaning, disagreement, and discontent. In the research with the Druze, for example, the majority of girls and women did not merely accept or identify with the hierarchy of roles and status common in their society; rather, they stated that the father’s or husband’s demands were unfair and violated the rights and entitlements of wives and daughters.

Altogether, the findings concerning the perspectives of those in subordinate positions in society underscore the contested nature of social and moral life and are suggestive of the critical role that disagreement, opposition, and resistance might play in social and moral development. Cultural psychologists, however, have made light of those perspectives and of the possibility that they reflect opposition and resistance (e.g., Miller, 2001; Menon & Shweder, 1998).

In the last several years, cultural psychologists have come to acknowledge that persons occupying subordinate positions in traditional societies might express discontent with their life, complain about the burdens imposed on them, and engage in behaviors meant to communicate their dissatisfaction. Cultural psychologists nevertheless deny that such behaviors implicate genuine concerns with personal autonomy, rights, and justice, or that
they are meant to challenge or subvert fundamental aspects of cultural norms and practices. Rather, their argument has been that “dissent is frequently directed at relatively superficial or overt aspects of cultural practices, with more fundamental cultural commitments remaining unchallenged” (Miller, 2001, p. 166; see also Menon & Shweder, 1998).

Consider, as an example, the interpretations given by cultural psychologists to the findings from an ethnographic study conducted with Oriya Hindu women of the temple town of Bhubaneswar (Menon & Shweder, 1998). Women, it was found in that study, are discontent with their everyday lives, feel unappreciated, and make their feelings of displeasure known by dragging their feet, complaining loudly, and withholding their advice. These behaviors, we are told, do not suggest resistance or subversion. “In Old Town they are just the ways in which confident women express their dissatisfaction or displeasure with what is happening within the family” (Menon & Shweder, 1998, p. 179). When seen from a cultural perspective, Oriya Hindu women are not “subversive rebels, but rather active upholders of a moral order that Western feminists have largely failed to comprehend. High on the list of virtues and values in the moral order upheld by Oriya women are chastity, modesty, duty, self-discipline, the deferment of gratification, self-improvement, and the ideal of domestic ‘service’. Low on the list are liberty and social equality” (p. 156). It should be noted that this position does not articulate what does constitute credible evidence of genuine expressions of resistance and opposition. (Might the discontents and resentments that fueled Blacks’ and women’s opposition to the cultural values and practices prevailing in the United States in the 1960s have counted as genuine expressions of thwarted autonomy and violated rights? It is possible that cultural psychologists would grant them such a status, insofar as those behaviors occurred in the context of an individualistic society oriented to the pursuit of individual goals, rights, and freedoms. In that case, one might question the basis on which a society that denies rights to Blacks and women is thought of as “rights oriented”). More important, this position minimizes and trivializes the behaviors and perspectives of those who occupy subordinate positions in traditional societies.

The judgments and behaviors of persons in subordinate positions, including the evidence pointing to discontent, resistance, opposition, and subversion, reveal their deep understanding of personal goals, entitlements, and autonomy as well as their concern with justice and rights. They also reveal the willingness and readiness, on the side of those in subordinate positions, to participate in the life of their communities while also engaging in cultural critique. The descriptions emerging from journalistic accounts and research indicate that discontent, resistance, opposition, and subversion not only are part of the everyday lives of persons in subordinate positions, but often involve nontrivial physical and emotional commitments and risks on their side. When women in traditional societies engage in overt and covert behaviors meant to circumvent and subvert aspects of their culture’s practices and norms they consider unfair or overly restrictive, their behavior is not limited to complaining or dragging their feet. They form alliances with other women in an effort to gain power that allows them to manipulate circumstances in ways that are beneficial to them; they engage in deception about their own and other women’s whereabouts and secretly take and horde resources for the purpose of pursuing forbidden goals and activities; they bargain, complain, pretend, hide, and run away to avoid being forced into marriages or arrangements they do not desire; and they engage in open confrontation and defiance—and at times form political organizations—to protect their own and other women’s freedoms and integrity. In doing so, they risk being ostracized, cut off from their children, beaten, burned, and killed. Members of lower and disenfranchised castes within traditional societies make demands and engage in confrontations, including physical confrontations, thereby risking their livelihoods and lives.
By dismissing or minimizing those judgments and behaviors, cultural analyses overlook the sincerity and depth of the pain afflicting people in subordinate positions, the genuineness and legitimacy of their resentment and anger, the seriousness of their engagement, and the complexity of their moral commitments. Dismissing or minimizing the perspectives of those in subordinate positions, however, might be an unavoidable element of psychological theories that view participation in culture, and identification and compliance with culture, as explanations for development.

The reliance on processes of participation in culture and identification with culture as explanations for social and moral development ignores the crucial roles that disagreement, conflict, and subversion may have in social and moral development. It also ignores that compliant or consenting behaviors and attitudes might conceal the workings of power within hierarchical contexts. “One aspect of power is the ability to define what counts as knowledge and to make definitions of knowledge appear natural rather than artificially constructed . . . [power] is not necessarily experienced as directly coercive, but frames, molds and structures the settings in which people live their lives and what they can and cannot do without being subject to coercive violence” (Gjerde, 2004, p. 145). The absence of discontent and opposition cannot therefore be merely presumed to indicate that persons have genuinely and freely chosen to participate in, or identified with, their culture’s practices and traditions. Instead, it might reflect the very conditions of deprivation and injustice in which those cultural practices and traditions arise and may, furthermore, serve to reproduce them (Baumrind, 1998; Nussbaum, 1999; Okin, 1999).

Whereas developmental research has shown that individuals in subordinate positions often judge that they (and others) should acquiesce to the demands of cultural norms and practices even though they do not identify with those demands and judge them to be unjust (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), the argument made here refers to the more extreme case in which individuals do not seem to recognize the unfairness of the arrangements by which they live. In an article suggestively entitled *God created me to be a slave*, Burkett (1997) reports on Mauritania’s 90,000 slaves and, based on conversations with members of this community, notes that “the possibility of rebellion, like the possibility of a world made up entirely of free men and women, is inconceivable among people who have lost their collective memory of freedom” (p. 57). Conditions of injustice much less extreme than slavery may also result in the acceptance of oppressive conditions. Having lacked even minimal access to education or employment, women might no longer express a desire for it. Having been subjected to veiling, purdah, or genital mutilation, women might endorse, and even enforce, those practices. In the view of some, people who have had “such a reduced menu of options . . . can be said to have chosen only in a reduced sense” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 23); it cannot therefore be assumed that those individuals may have freely chosen or consented to their conditions (Baumrind, 1998; Okin, 1999; Sunstein, 1999).

The notion of false consciousness or, in Nussbaum’s (1999) terms, “deformation of desire,” is complex and besieged by controversy. At the heart of the problem is whether a practice or tradition can be deemed unjust or oppressive if the presumed victims do not experience it as unjust or oppressive. Some contend that it is “patronizing, even impertinent” (Parekh, 1999, p. 73) to view individuals as misguided victims of false consciousness, and that doing so disempowers them and reinforces the very images of vulnerability and unfitness that are commonly used to justify their curtailed choices (Bhabha, 1999; Minow, 2002; Parekh, 1999). It may, on the other hand, be argued that the perspectives of outsiders should not be dismissed outright, especially in those situations in which oppression and injustice have been longstanding and pervasive, as they may point to possibilities that—as in the case of Mauritania’s slaves—are no longer recalled or contemplated. “A voice that
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is in some sense foreign [may be] essential to the self expression of a marginalized or oppressed group: for people often appropriate good ideas from outside and vindicate their dignity by pointing to examples of respect elsewhere” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 8).

The dismissal of the possibility that the critical perspectives of persons occupying subordinate positions might implicate concerns with autonomy and justice, and the absence of bewilderment *vis-a-vis* a person’s preference for oppression over freedom, are not desultory or incoherent; they do, in fact, make sense within certain assumptions about the nature of culture and development. If cultures are integrated, coherent, and harmonious, and a person’s thoughts, emotions, and morality—her preferences and desires—are shaped by culture, “resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion” (Shweder, 1990, p. 1), it would make sense that persons choose or cherish cultural conditions that, from an outsider’s point of view, curtail their freedom and choices. After all, from such a cultural perspective, the preference of autonomy and rights is merely a product of culture, neither more nor less in tune with human nature than the preference of submission and inequality (or “chastity, modesty, duty, self-discipline, the deferment of gratification, self-improvement, and the ideal of domestic service”; Menon & Shweder, 1998, p. 156).

As evidenced in the research and other accounts considered thus far, cultures are not harmonious monoliths, and striving for agency and autonomy (along with striving for justice, mutuality, and friendship) are not parochial, Western inventions. Both the recognition of culture as a nucleus of power and conflict, and the idea of a common human nature—albeit one that is liable to being constrained by features of social and cultural organization—make a person’s choice of subjugation over freedom opaque and begging explanation. Although it would be naive to claim that the question of false consciousness is straightforward, it might make sense to remain skeptical about the meanings of compliance and consent on the part of persons living lives of deprivation.

Altogether, the varied social and moral perspectives of people within cultures, the contextual variations observed in their judgments and behaviors, and the critical perspectives they develop about their culture’s norms and practices challenge cultural psychologists’ conceptualization of culture. Even as they acknowledge that there is some diversity within all cultures, cultural psychologists have assumed that there is, within cultures, substantial homogeneity in cultural meanings and practices. Indeed, the homogeneity in cultural meanings and practices is thought to be substantial enough to allow for meaningful comparisons among the main orientations of different cultures.

The data considered thus far in this chapter indicate strongly that there is little homogeneity to cultural meanings and cultural practices. Social and moral life within cultures features many layers and levels of diversity, plurality, and conflict. Significant variations in social reasoning and social behavior occur within cultures and within individuals. Adults and children, in traditional and Western societies alike, develop multiple social and moral concerns, and approach social contexts within their cultures with flexibility. Orientations to both autonomy and interdependence are central to their social relationships. Adults and children reflect on their culture’s norms and practices, and often take critical positions with respect to some of them and attempt to subvert or change them. Power differences constitute a central dimension along which substantial heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity, emerges within cultures. This heterogeneity becomes instantiated in diverse experiences of seemingly identical situations, different perspectives on cultural practices, and diverse goals and interest. It is hard to see how any one set of substantially homogeneous cultural meanings can be identified within such heterogeneous environments. Instead, the many specific social contexts in which individuals participate within their culture, and their
varied and conflicting interpretations and evaluations of such contexts, ought to be the focus of the study of social and moral development.

It should be noted, however, that the notion of culture has long been viewed as critical for anchoring the idea of human diversity. Cultural differences (differences among cultures) have been intricately associated with the fight against racism and, more recently, with the promotion of multiculturalism and the rights of cultures. It could therefore be argued that, in downplaying differences among cultures, the acultural discourse proposed here—a discourse that focuses on the multiple contexts, diverse experiences, and heterogeneous perspectives of persons within cultures—obeys the range of human diversity. The opposite view is argued herein. Not only, as indicated by the data considered, is the range of human diversity not fully represented in terms of cultural differences, but the construct of culture—as typically used in cultural analyses—cannot serve as the basis for promoting respect for human diversity and justice. These issues are addressed in the next section.

CAPTURING MORAL DIVERSITY, AND THE PROBLEMS OF CULTURE

The concept of culture has been associated with struggles against social hierarchies and racism, and with the promotion of tolerance for diversity. As typically used in the social sciences, however, the construct of culture has been implicated in the perpetuation of various forms of violence, discrimination, and oppression. To understand why this has been so, it is necessary to review, even if cursorily, the social and historical circumstances surrounding the rise of the idea of culture (for more comprehensive accounts, see Finkielkraut, 1995; Hatch, 1983).

Culture first emerged as an alternative to the concept of race early in the 20th century. Breaking with traditional anthropology, Boas (1908, 1938) disputed the 19th-century evolutionist view that races exhibit fixed moral and intellectual differences and proposed, instead, that those differences can be explained in terms of cultural conditioning. Whereas evolutionists thought in terms of a single direction in history, one of “progress,” which led them to rank societies relative to one another, Boas and others (e.g., Benedict, 1934; Herskovits, 1955) advanced the idea that each culture has its own unique pattern of development and pursues its own goals, thereby challenging the belief in the superiority of Western civilization. Soon, Boasian thought became standard anthropological thought; anthropologists no longer spoke of savages and civilized peoples but of cultures, a term that carried no evaluative implications. Along with the idea of cultures came the idea of tolerance—the belief that all cultures ought to be given equal respect. This idea of tolerance was a much welcome alternative to the Victorian proposition concerning the superiority of Western civilization, a proposition used to justify Western expansionism and the imposition of civilized Western standards on savages.

It is not difficult to see why culture became not only a central feature of anthropological thinking, but also a concept of tremendous sociopolitical importance. It is likely, in fact, that the notion of tolerance, and the related ideas of human dignity and self-determination, have always been at the basis of the strong appeal enjoyed by the construct of culture in the social sciences. Few would disagree with the proposition that the peremptory criticism of the traditions of other cultures is unjustified. However, the equally peremptory expectation that all aspects of a culture be judged as acceptable is also unjustified. Such an expectation is inconsistent with the driving force behind tolerance; positive judgments “on demand” are not genuine expressions of respect. More significantly, the presumption that all aspects of cultures are acceptable, and the demand that the integrity of cultures be protected, overlook
(or dismiss) the possibility that some cultural practices might be unjust and oppressive (Hatch, 1983).

The import of these issues is far from being merely academic. In recent years, cultural traditions and practices such as female genital mutilation, footbinding, forced marriages, honor-related violence, seclusion/purdah, and polygamy have generated complex debates across the world. Consider, as one example, the practice of female genital mutilation (hereafter referred to as FGM), which although widely resisted, is still common in many African countries. The devastating short- and long-term effects of FGM on women’s health and sexuality have been amply documented (Amnesty International, 1995; World Health Organization, 1994). Nonetheless, in the view of proponents of tolerance, diversity, and cultural integrity, FGM is, in the countries where it is practiced, “not only popular but fashionable” (Shweder, 2002) and no different from Western practices such as breast augmentation and other medically unnecessary and potentially harmful procedures promoted by Western conceptions of female beauty (see also Tamir, 1996); Western criticisms of FGM—it is further argued—are emotional responses of disgust (“yuck responses”; Shweder, 2002, p. 222), which violate the right of individuals to perpetuate their culture (Gilman, 1999; Parekh, 1999).

The likening of FGM to matters of taste or aesthetics ignores crucial distinctions between procedures such as FGM and breast augmentation. FGM is carried out by force on small girls as young as 4 or 5 years, and even when the girls are older their consent is not solicited; the preferences and decisions of the women who perform the operation are constrained by conditions such as illiteracy, malnutrition, economic dependency, intimidation, and lack of political power. By contrast, procedures common in Western societies, such as breast augmentation, are undergone largely by adults whose menu of choices is considerably richer; the misinformation and social pressure that may affect their choice decision to undergo such procedures, although deplorable, are not the same as physical force and coercion. In overlooking those distinctions, proponents of tolerance trivialize the experiences of the girls and women who are subjected to FGM. It is the dismissal of the experiences and perspectives of some people in a culture and their right to decide which aspects of their culture they wish to perpetuate, that makes it possible to endorse practices such as FGM as well as the position that all aspects of culture are acceptable and valuable.

The debates concerning FGM and other such cultural practices have come even closer to home, because thousands of individuals have emigrated from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia and brought their cultural practices along with them into European and North American countries. Although most agree that immigrants ought to be treated with the same respect as everyone else, there is little agreement concerning what, precisely, that means. Should immigrants be allowed to continue practicing, in Western societies, cultural practices such as FGM, footbinding, or polygamy? Should they be allowed to

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1Although various terms, such as female circumcision, clitoridectomy, infibulation, and female genital mutilation (FGM) are often used indistinctly, they represent distinctly different procedures; FGM is the standard term for all those procedures in the medical literature. Female circumcision has been rejected by international medical practitioners because it suggests the analogy to male circumcision, which is generally believed to have no harmful effects on health and sexual functioning. Although there are some cases of symbolic procedures among girls and women that involve no removal of tissue, those procedures are not included in the category of FGM by international agencies. On the other hand, the male equivalent of clitoridectomy is the amputation of most of the penis; the male equivalent of infibulation is the removal of the entire penis and part of the scrotal skin. Approximately 85% of women who undergo FGM have clitoridectomy. Although infibulation accounts for only 15% of the total, 80% to 90% of all operations in Sudan and Somalia are of this kind (for more details, see Nussbaum, 1999, Chap. 4).
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take their children, who may have been born and raised in a Western country, back to their
country of origin to be married against their will? More generally, should respect for their
culture take precedence over civil rights and the principle of equality?

Advocates of cultural diversity are likely to answer in the affirmative. In fact, “cultural
defenses” are now increasingly invoked in the United States (Maslow-Cohen & Bledsoe,
2002) and in other Western countries (Wikan, 2002) on behalf of members of immigrant
groups charged with committing domestic crimes. Underlying this strategy is the pre-
sumption that persons socialized in a foreign culture should not be held fully accountable
for behavior that violates official law, if their behavior conforms to their own culture’s
norms (Maslow-Cohen & Bledsoe, 2002). Furthermore, the argument is that only a de-
fense that allows evidence of the act’s cultural ground to be admitted in its own terms can
provide a person with an opportunity to be understood in authentic terms (Honig, 1999).
The cultural defense (“my culture made me do it”) is being used in the United States
more widely than it is generally recognized and, often with success, in cases involving
FGM, murder of wives presumed to have committed adultery by male immigrants from
Asian and Middle Eastern countries, kidnap and rape by Hmong Laotian men alleging
that their actions are part of their cultural practice of “marriage by capture” (zij poj niam),
and murder of children by Japanese or Chinese mothers (who also attempted to take their
own lives) alleging that mother–child suicide is meant to rectify the shame and damage
caued by a husband’s infidelity (Maslow-Cohen & Bledsoe, 2002; Okin, 1999).

Inevitably, the notion of cultural defense as it relates to the understanding of moral
diversity raises difficult issues. Cultural defenses entail the recognition that to fully un-
derstand a person’s behavior it is necessary to understand the meanings within which he or
she functions and makes decisions. However, cultural defenses also privilege the status of
culture by denigrating the equal status of victims. Furthermore, because cultural survival
tends to implicate largely the behavior of women and children (“how far would an Algerian
immigrant get, I wonder, if he refused to pay the interest on his Visa bill on the grounds that
Islam forbids interest on borrowed money,” asks Katha Pollitt [1999, p. 29]), it is they who
most often pay the price for tolerance and respect for culture. Consider Wikan’s (2002)
report of the deeply disturbing events surrounding instances of abductions and “honor
killings” among immigrants in Norway. By her report, girls and young women from the
immigrant community often come to serious harm at the hand of their male relatives. They
are beaten or killed because they had presumably acted in disregard for “their culture.”
These young women were raised, and many were even born, in Norway. How should
it be decided, and who should decide, what their culture is? “Who is the quintessential
‘immigrant’ . . . is he or she a first generation immigrant only, or are the children of immi-
grants also included? If so . . . how many generations does it take? . . . What is the identity
of a girl, or a boy, who has grown up in historical circumstances different from those of
the parents?” (Wikan, 2002, p. 72).

The criticism of the proposition that practices such as FGM and honor killings (whether
carried out in other cultures or in the midst of Western societies) should be tolerated need
not be taken to mean that concerns with ethnocentrism and racism are trivial: those are
significant concerns that merit close consideration. Neither does this criticism imply that
the task of distinguishing between cultural practices that (although unpalatable) should
be tolerated and those that should be resisted is uncomplicated: that task is vexing, and
reasonable people could reach different conclusions about particular cases. The critical
discussion of cultural practices such as FGM and honor killings was, instead, meant to
underscore that the force of arguments for tolerance of diversity and for the perpetuation
of cultural traditions rests largely on the view of cultures as organic totalities whose members
speak in a single voice (whether or not it is their genitals that are being mutilated, or their freedom to participate in society that is being restricted). Cultures comprise multiple and conflicting goals and perspectives, including some that may be distorted or silent. The construct of culture as typically used by cultural psychologists, and the associated notions of cultural integrity and tolerance, tend to promote or legitimize the goals and perspectives of some members of a society at the expense of the goals and perspectives of others. The notion of culture, it is argued here, is not well suited for capturing the diversity of human experience or for furthering respect for persons and justice.

This discussion illustrates that thinking of diversity in terms of cultural differences does not acknowledge the fact that people are—or should be—free to decide “which traditions they want to perpetuate and which they want to discontinue, how they want to deal with their history, with one another, and so on” (Habermas, 1994, p. 125). This problem, namely that the anchoring of diversity in terms of cultural differences can lead to trampling with individuals’ freedom to decide what aspects of their culture they wish to preserve and which they wish to reject, is also evidenced in discussions about multiculturalism.

Unlike the cases described, bearing on cultural practices that entail inflicting harm or restricting the freedoms of some members of a culture, the notion of multiculturalism does not suggest internal conflicts or the silencing of certain voices. On the contrary, the idea of multiculturalism calls to mind instances in which persons speak in a collective cultural voice for the explicit purpose of articulating overlapping experiences, meanings, and identities in response to situations of injustice and inequality. Toward the end of the 20th century, many such collective voices emerged under the banner of multiculturalism and identity politics. In the United States, for example, the 1960s universalistic discourse of racial desegregation and civil rights gave way, by the late 1970s, to a discourse on culture and cultural identity. A collective voice—a call for black power, for example—was articulated as a means for contesting racism; the very act of rediscovering and celebrating African-American culture was seen as a powerful means for discrediting wholesale racist scripts (Boykin, 1983; Boykin & Toms, 1985; McLoyd, 2004). The expectation underlying identity politics was that public recognition of collective identities would contribute to the empowerment and advancement of previously disenfranchised groups (Taylor, 1994). By articulating collective identities and demanding that their culture be recognized and respected for its particularity (e.g., as African Americans), underprivileged groups were expected to “turn into an object of pride what they had been taught to be ashamed of” (Finkielkraut, 1995, p. 68).

Insofar as those collective cultural identities are acknowledged as partially overlapping representations that become articulated at a specific time and around specific shared experiences and goals (Gjerde, 2004), they may be of considerable social and political (perhaps also psychological) value for furthering the rights of individuals and groups. Under the banner of multiculturalism and identity politics, however, cultural identities have been typically reified and made into bounded and transhistorical realities.

Ethnopolitics stresses, ideologizes, reifies, modifies, and sometimes virtually recreates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilizes. Ethnic categories are thus validated as forming ethnic groups, and these groups are defined with reference to a culture they are assumed to share.... [The abstract notion of culture] is replaced by a reified entity that has a definite substantive content and assumed the status of a thing that people “have” or “are members of”.... a substantive heritage that is normative, predictive of individuals’ behavior, and ultimately a cause of social action.” (Baumann, 1996, pp. 11–12).
This move into a reified notion of culture, although perhaps necessary to effect social and political change, holds grave danger to the autonomy of members of those collectivities both at the individual and at the societal levels. Culture does not capture the multiplicity of experiences and voices (concerns, goals, perspectives) of persons within societies. All people, regardless of their group of origin, have the right to be regarded as individuals and not just as a part of a group. In a compelling response to Taylor’s (1994) “The Politics of Recognition,” a strong endorsement of multiculturalism and group rights, Appiah (1994) pointed to the perils that collective identities have for individuals, even as he recognized the urgent historical circumstances in which those identities emerge:

In our current situation in the multicultural West . . . certain individuals have not been treated with equal dignity because they were, for example, women, homosexuals, blacks. . . . In order to construct a life with dignity, it seems natural to take the collective identity and construct positive life-scripts instead. An African-American after the Black Power movement takes the old script of self-hatred, the script in which he or she is a nigger, and works, in community with others, to construct a series of positive Black life-scripts . . . It may even be historically, strategically necessary for the story to go this way. But I think we need to . . . ask whether the identities constructed in this way are ones we . . . can be happy with in the longer run. Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made. It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will ask whether we have not replaced one kind of tyranny with another. . . . If I had to choose between the world of the closet and the world of gay liberation, or between the world of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Black Power, I would, of course, choose in each case the latter. But I would like not to have to choose. (pp. 160–163)

Consideration of gender as a collective category, the role of power in defining gender identities, and the situation of women who have been constrained by their collective identity as “nothing but women,” can furnish further evidence that collective identities such as those defined by culture or ethnicity may pose dangers to the individual. Consideration of those issues can also suggest how, for example, African Americans, immigrants, or gays, could be constrained by the expectation that they make their ethnic identity, country of origin, or sexual orientation the central part of their lives (Wolf, 1994).

None of these considerations, however, are meant to suggest that the diversity of human experience is unimportant. The construct of culture, as instantiated in cultural identities, can serve as a means for self-determination and resistance. Nevertheless, when reified into integrated, coherent, and harmonious entities capable of dictating meaning, it also has the potential for becoming a repressive straightjacket.

At the societal level, concerns with diversity and cultural identities have become instantiated in the notion of multiculturalism and the demands for cultural rights. By the end of the 20th century, the demands for the recognition of cultural identities and cultural rights were a main staple in the political discourse of liberal democracies. In the course of the ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy of cultural rights (whose specifics are beyond the scope of this chapter), Habermas (1994) articulated a central distinction between granting rights to cultures (an enterprise he likened to “the preservation of species by administrative means”) and the obligation of societies to ensure that persons have the freedom to live according to the prescription of their cultural heritage without suffering discrimination because of it. This distinction is helpful for understanding that the challenging of culture neither equals nor implies indifference toward human diversity. On the
contrary, the challenging of the construct of culture reflects the belief that persons should have “the opportunity to confront [their own] culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it; as well as the opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference, or break with it self-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided identity” (Habermas, 1994, p. 132).

Proponents of cultural rights and of tolerance of cultural diversity—proponents, that is, of culture as the measure of diversity—might argue that the failure to recognize human diversity as enshrined in cultures blends the distinctiveness of persons’ experiences across the world into a homogenous and unauthentic mold (Taylor, 1994). The argument put forth here is that the idea of culture, as typically understood, underscores participation in culture and acceptance of cultural norms and practices and dismisses the possibility that some members of cultures might dislike, resent, oppose, resist, and wish to change some aspects of their culture. Although meant to be liberating in its acceptance and respect for divergent traditions, the notion of culture has been used to implicitly and explicitly justify norms, arrangements, and practices that are unjust and oppressive. The reliance on the notion of culture as a main anchor of human diversity obstructs the promotion of both respect for diversity and justice (Wainryb, 2004b), an approach that recognizes the multiple and conflicting perspectives within cultures is better suited for the task.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: MORAL DIVERSITY AND UNIVERSALITY IN CULTURE

The discourse about culture has enjoyed a sort of conceptual and communicative hegemony in the world of psychological research. This discourse has centered on an understanding of culture stamped with assertions of holism and integration. This view of culture ignores systems of inequality within societies and conceals the varied and complex experiences of individuals. It overestimates the power of society to dictate meaning and underestimates individual agency, rendering the process of development as one of conservative adaptation to culture, and individuals as cultural imprints. Adopting a more critical understanding of culture implies discarding the language of coherence and harmony, and acknowledging that cultures are made up of individuals who have diverse concerns and goals, and are capable of reflecting on values, practices, and traditions, embracing some and rejecting others. It also implies acknowledging that, in any community, persons, especially those in unequal positions, are bound to develop different, and often conflicting, perspectives. Hence, the study of social and moral development in culture must attend to the many contexts of social life in cultures and to the varied ways in which individuals make sense of their experiences in those social contexts. This is not to say that the social and moral lives of persons in culture are devoid of pattern. Rather, within cultures, multiple partial and overlapping patterns assert themselves to varying degrees, in different social contexts, and different realms of experience.

Speaking about the diversity within cultures does not imply that differences among cultures do not exist or are trivial. To be sure, historical, social, and political circumstances shape and frame extremely different developmental contexts for people in different parts of the world. Moreover, societies differ substantially in regard to the realms of life that are organized around hierarchical relations (e.g., economic, family, religious), the extent to which hierarchical differences are sanctioned and institutionalized, and the opportunities for individuals to gain (or lose) power and status. In some cultures, for example, there are sharp status distinctions between men and women within the family, and strong sanctions associated with disobedience or transgressions. Some of the research considered in this
chapter indicated that concerns with, for example, autonomy and rights, or parent–child conflicts, are manifested differently in such societies. At the same time, the research indicated that multiple social and moral considerations other than hierarchical distinctions also apply in such hierarchically organized cultures, including concerns with personal autonomy and conflicts between people of different status. It also showed that less hierarchically organized societies are not free of status distinctions and inequalities. Analyses of social and moral development in cultures must, therefore, be sensitive to the variety of cultural conditions and arrangements; indeed, it is the homogenizing effect of culture and its tyrannical ways that need resisting. While attending to the complexity within societies, research must remain alert to potential differences between societies, including the multiple and distinct ways in which persons and groups are being mistreated or oppressed within their culture.

Urging sensitivity to contextual specificity and cultural conditions, however, is not the same as posing distinct, essential, human natures, or arguing for moral relativism. Nussbaum (1999) has made a strong case for why universalism is the best path to promote diversity, pluralism, and tolerance, as have other political philosophers (e.g., Okin, 1999), anthropologists (e.g., Hatch, 1983; Wikan, 2002), and psychologists (e.g., Turiel, 2002; Wainryb, 2004b). Appiah (1992) put it succinctly: “We shall solve our problems if we seem them as human problems arising out of a special situation; and we shall not solve them if we see them as African problems, generated by our being somehow unlike others” (pp. 179). Although he made this comment in reference to the challenges inherent to Pan-African politics, Appiah’s call to resist the essentialization of cultural differences is of foremost importance to the study of social and moral development.

This can be accomplished by being at once alert to patterns of differences between and within cultures and skeptical of the coherence of culture. As illustrated by the research considered in this chapter, persons in different cultures experience both autonomy and connectedness in the context of their multiple, more or less hierarchically organized, relationships. Persons in different cultures also negotiate the intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts that unavoidably result from the coexistence of multiple social goals and types of relationships. Cooperation, submission, opposition, and subversion all coexist within contested cultural landscapes. To capture the diversity of social and moral life across cultures while both steering clear from dangerous essentializations and giving voice to the multiple and dynamic perspectives that coexist within cultures, research on social and moral development should focus its attention on the local ways in which goals and concerns with matters of justice, autonomy, friendship, mutuality, and tradition are played out in harmony or conflict, in distinct contexts, within different cultures. Research must also question presumptions about children’s and adults’ acceptance of cultural norms and practices and, instead, set out to identify the local forms that cooperation, submission, opposition, and subversion take in different societies. In moving away from the construct of culture as the main anchor of human diversity, research on social and moral development has the potential for documenting the range of diversity in human development—not the different moral outlooks of different cultures, but the multiple and conflicting outlooks of different people within different cultures.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 8


